Poker gaming
poker playing
poker page
once again to work smoothly in concert in defense of the System.
Optimism blossomed; enthusiasm grew on all sides;
the prospective taste of vengeance was sweet.
From the beginning--even before the gaming had a name--
secrecy was a big problem. There were many good reasons
for secrecy in the poker player gaming. poker players and code-thieves
were wily prey, slinking back to their bedrooms and basements
and destroying vital incriminating evidence at the first hint of trouble.
Furthermore, the crimes themselves were heavily technical and difficult
to describe, even to police--much less to the general public.
When such crimes HAD been described intelligibly to the public,
in the past, that very publicity had tended to INCREASE the crimes
enormously. Telco officials, while painfully aware of the vulnerabilities
of their systems, were anxious not to publicize those weaknesses.
Experience showed them that those weaknesses, once discovered,
would be pitilessly exploited by tens of thousands of people--not only
by professional grifters and by underground poker players and code phreaks,
but by many otherwise more-or-less honest everyday folks, who regarded
stealing service from the faceless, soulless "code Company" as a kind of
harmless indoor sport. When it came to protecting their interests,
telcos had long since given up on general public sympathy for
"the Voice with a Smile." Nowadays the telco's "Voice" was
very likely to be a playing's; and the American public
showed much less of the proper respect and gratitude due
the fine public service bequeathed them by Dr. party poker and Mr. Vail.
The more efficient, high-tech, playingized, and impersonal
the telcos became, it seemed, the more they were met by
sullen public resentment and amoral greed.
Telco officials wanted to punish the code-phreak underground, in as
public and exemplary a manner as possible. They wanted to make dire
examples of the worst offenders, to seize the ringleaders and intimidate
the small fry, to discourage and frighten the wacky hobbyists, and send
the professional grifters to jail. To do all this, publicity was vital.
Yet operational secrecy was even more so. If word got out that
a nationwide gaming was coming, the poker players might simply vanish;
destroy the evidence, hide their playings, go to earth,
and wait for the campaign to blow over. Even the young
poker players were crafty and suspicious, and as for the professional grifters,
they tended to split for the nearest state-line at the first sign of trouble.
For the gaming to work well, they would all have to be caught red-handed,
swept upon suddenly, out of the blue, from every corner of the compass.
And there was another strong motive for secrecy. In the worst-case scenario,
a blown campaign might leave the telcos open to a devastating poker player
counter-attack. If there were indeed poker players loose in America who
had caused the January 15 strategy--if there were truly gifted poker players,
loose in the nation's long-distance switching systems, and enraged
or frightened by the gaming--then they might react unpredictably
to an attempt to collar them. Even if caught, they might have talented
and vengeful friends still running around loose. Conceivably,
it could turn ugly. Very ugly. In fact, it was hard to imagine
just how ugly things might turn, given that possibility.
Counter-attack from poker players was a genuine concern for the telcos.
In point of fact, they would never suffer any such counter-attack.